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CAN THE IRS "WHITEOUT" A
SURROGATE'S COURT DECISION ON
THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF
ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES UNDER
I.R.C. § 2053? UNITED STATES v.
WHITE
The struggle for power between the federal government and
the states dates back to the birth of the nation. 1 Part of the success of our governmental system can be attributed to the acquiescence of one to the other when the law permits but does not demand it.' At other times, the power is expressly delegated to only
one or the other.' It is the right of Congress to levy taxes and to
determine the basis for the tax.' The Department of the Treasury
is responsible for interpreting and enforcing the tax code.5 Under
I.R.C. § 2053(a)(2), Congress stated that administration expenses
' U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."). See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (commerce clause gave Congress and not the States the right to regulate interstate commerce). See also Minnesota v.
Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890) (state law requiring meat inspection by local inspectors within
twenty four hours of slaughter invalidated as a restriction of Commerce Clause by effectively banning meats from sister states).
I See, e.g., Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912) (state inspection laws applied to goods
brought into the state from outside the state are within the state police power if reasonable); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (Pennsylvania law requiring use of local pilots upheld even though Congress had power under Commerce Clause to
preempt the area).
I See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 5 (Congress has power to coin money); U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 10, cl. I ("No State shall ... coin Money ....
). See also supra note I for examples.
" U.S. CoNs-r. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See Brundage v. United States, 275 F.2d 424 (7th Cir.)
(purpose of tax laws is taxation of income of those benefitting from income), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 831 (1960); Bahen & Wright, Inc. v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1949)
(Congress can impose tax on entities not recognized by state law); Atlas Life Ins. Co. v.
United States, 216 F. Supp. 457 (N.D. Okla. 1963) (Congress can classify income for purpose of taxation), rev'd, 333 F.2d 389 (10th Cir. 1964), rev'd, 381 U.S. 233 (1965).
& 26 U.S.C. § 7801 (1986). See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967) (task
of prescribing rules and regulations to enforce Code given by Congress to Commissioner).
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of an estate are deductible if the expenses are allowable under the
laws of the jurisdiction where the estate is being administered.6
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has claimed that this is only a
threshold determination and that the administration expense must
also meet federal standards.7 Those standards are: 1) the administration expense must meet the Treasury Regulation § 20.20533(a)8 requirements that the expense be actually and necessarily incurred in settling the estate,' and; 2) the amount deducted must
6 I.R.C.

§ 2053(a)(2) in pertinent part states:
RULE.-For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value of
the taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate such amounts(2) for administration expenses ....as are allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction,
whether within or without the United States, under which the estate is being
administered.
(A) GENERAL

Id.
This section was originally enacted in the Revenue Act of 1916 as § 203(a)(1). The original language permitted deductions "as are allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction ......
I.R.C. § 203(a)(1) (1916) (emphasis added). This was changed to allowable in the 1954 Code.
I.R.C. § 2053(a) (1954) (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit suggested that this change implied a policy that formal probated actions that determine permissible deductions under
the Code should not be relied upon. Pitner v. United States, 388 F.2d 651, 655 (5th Cir.
1967).
' See Pitner, 388 F.2d at 659 (deduction of administration expense must meet federal
standards); Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650, 662 (1972) (laws of jurisdiction
establish a threshold condition but expenses must also satisfy the regulations in order to be
deductible); Response of the United States to the Brief Amicus Curiae of the Monroe
County Bar Association at 4-5, United States v. White, 650 F. Supp. 904 (W.D.N.Y. 1987)
(No. 86-140T) (deductibility of administration expenses is a question of federal law).
TREAS. REG. § 20.2053-3(a). This regulation states in pertinent part:
DEDUCTION FOR EXPENSES OF ADMINISTERING ESTATE.
(A) IN GENERAL. The amounts deductible from a decedent's

gross estate as "administration expenses" of the first category ... are limited to such expenses as are actually and necessarily, incurred in the administration of the decedent's estate; that is,
in the collection of assets, payment of debts, and distribution of property to the
persons entitled to it. The expenses contemplated in the law are such only as attend
the settlement of an estate and the transfer of the property of the estate to individual beneficiaries or to a trustee, whether the trustee is the executor or some other
person. Expenditures not essential to the proper settlement of the estate, but incurred for the individual benefit of the heirs, legatees, or devisees, may not be taken
as deductions. Administration expenses include (1) executor's commissions; (2) attorney's fees; and (3) miscellaneous expenses.
Id.
Id. See Marcus v. DeWitt, 704 F.2d 1227, 1230 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (IRS position is that an
expense incurred for a beneficiary instead of for the estate is not deductible even if it
would be allowed under state law); Pitner, 388 F.2d at 659 (expense must be within federal
meaning of the term "administration expense"); Snyder v. United States, 582 F. Supp. 196
(D. Md. 1984) (interest on estate tax is proper administration expense and can be deductible if applicable regulations are followed). But see Estate of Park v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d

Deductibility of Administration Expenses
be reasonable under the circumstances." Treasury Regulation §
20.2053-1(b)(2) provides the IRS with the mechanism for challenging local court rulings that purport to determine the allowability of these expenses."1
Recently, in United States v. White,"2 the United States District
Court for the Western District of New York denied the IRS's petition for enforcement of two summonses for an attorney's records
673, 676 (6th Cir. 1973) (expenses allowable under state law are deductible); Estate of
Posen v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 355 (1980) (expenses of selling apartment were allowable
administrative expenses under New York law).
A commentator has suggested that the Commissioner's position on § 2053(a)(2) imposes
two tests: the first is that an expense must be an administrative one and the second that it
be allowable under the laws of the administering jurisdiction. Spragens, Current Appellate
Cases Create Conflict in Deductibility of Selling Costs as Administration Expenses Under Sec.
2053(aX2), 54 TAXES 429, 433-34 (1976). While Pitner is mentioned later in Spragens's article, no comment is given on the "reasonable" test put forth in Pitner. Id. Spragens contends that Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3 is merely an interpretation of the meaning of administration expense and therefore consistent with the statute. Id. at 433.
The estate tax has been likened to a transfer tax and as such, to distinguish between
expenses incurred for the estate as opposed to those incurred for the beneficiaries of the
estate has been offered as a reasonable distinction. Id. at 430. Spragens contends that any
other interpretation would be an unfair taxation and could result in the federal Treasury
subsidizing the selling costs of the heirs. Id. However, she makes no comment as to why
Congress was not more specific concerning its intention. Id.
10 Pitner, 388 F.2d at 659. See 4 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE
TAXATION § 26.28, at 98 (1959) ("the expense incurred must be reasonable").
" TREAs. REG. § 20.2053-1(b)(2). This regulation states:
EFFECT OF COURT DECREE. The decision of a local court as to the amount and allowability under local law of a claim or administration expense will ordinarily be accepted if the court passes upon the facts upon which deductibility depends. If the
court does not pass upon those facts, its decree will, of course, not be followed. For
example, if the question before the court is whether a claim should be allowed, the
decree allowing it will ordinarily be accepted even though it purports to decide the
facts upon which deductibility depends. It must appear that the court actually passed
upon the merits of the claim. This will be presumed in all cases of an active and
genuine contest. If the result reached appears to be unreasonable, this is some evidence that there was not such a contest, but it may be rebutted by proof to the
contrary. If the decree was rendered by consent, it will be accepted, provided the
consent was a bona fide recognition of the validity of the claim (and not a mere cloak
for a gift) and was accepted by the court as satisfactory evidence upon the merits. It
will be presumed that the consent was of this character, and was so accepted, if given
by all parties having an interest adverse to the claimant. The decree will not be
accepted if it is at variance with the law of the State; as, for example, an allowance
made to an executor in excess of that prescribed by statute. On the other hand, a
deduction for the amount of a bona fide indebtedness of the decedent, or of a 'easonable expense of administration, will not be denied because no court decree has
been entered if the amount would be allowable under local law.
id.
iS 650 F. Supp. 904 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
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concerning his work performed in settling an estate.13 The purpose behind the summonses was to determine the deductibility of
his fees under I.R.C. § 2053(a)(2) even though a New York Surrogate's Court had already determined the fees to be allowable
based on New York State law. 14 The court held that the IRS
could not make a de novo review15 of such a ruling in order to
disallow the deductibility of the attorney's fees unless the IRS had
prima facie evidence of fraud, overreaching, or some other showing that the Surrogate did not pass on the factors on which deductibility depends."
In White, James White acted as both executor and attorney for
the estate of Helen Smith. As executor, White filed a federal
estate tax return which included deductions pursuant to I.R.C. §
2053(a)(2) for his executor's fees as well as for his attorney's fees,
both of which had been approved by the Surrogate's Court. 8 An
estate tax attorney for the IRS informed White that justification
separate from the Surrogate's ruling of the fees claimed would
have to be submitted to the IRS before they would be allowed as a
deduction." He set forth the factors that the IRS would consider
in determining the appropriateness of the fees: the value of the
estate; the difficulty of problems; the length of administration; the
time, effort, ability and experience of the attorney; and the results
obtained.20 White responded by producing a letter from the Surrogate's Court stating that the attorney's fees were determined
1,Id. at 912.
' ld. at 905-06.
' Id. at 912. A de novo trial is to try "a matter anew; the same as if it had not been heard
before and as if no decision had been previously rendered." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 392
(5th ed. 1979).
' White, 650 F. Supp. at 911.
" Id. at 905. Acting in this dual capacity is allowed pursuant to N.Y. SURR. CT. Paoc ACT
§ 2307 (McKinney 1987).
I" White, 650 F. Supp. at 905. White claimed $16,530 in attorney's fees and $17,548.13
for his executor's commission. Id. The executor's commission was awarded under N.Y.
SURR. CT. PRoc. AcT § 2307 (McKinney 1987) and is not in issue here. Id. at 905-06.
White's figures had been approved by all of the legatees and thereafter reviewed and approved by Surrogate Ciaccio. Id. at 905.
Id. at 905-06.
" Id. at 906. These factors are to be applied to the individual facts and circumstances of
each case. Id. See Stein & Fierstein, The Role of the Attorney in Estate Administration, 68 MINN.
L. REv. 1107, 1173-74 (1984) (discussing factors in determining attorney's fees under the
A.B.A. Code and the A.B.A. Statement).

Deductibility of Administration Expenses
under the guidelines set forth by the New York Court of Appeals
in In re Freeman 1 and In re Estate of Potts,2 2 which included the
same factors as those listed by the IRS."
This letter was rejected by the IRS as unsatisfactory.2 4 A deficiency of $5,754.19 was assessed and two summonses were issued
to White to produce any and all documents and records concerning the administration of Smith's estate.2 5 White paid the deficiency with interest, but refused to comply with the summonses."
This action was then commenced by the United States to enforce
27
its summonses.
The court held that the IRS did not make the necessary showing that their investigation was conducted pursuant to a legitimate
purpose, and therefore the enforcement of the summonses was
34 N.Y.2d 1, 311 N.E.2d 480, 355 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1974).
- 241 N.Y. 593, 150 N.E. 568 (1925).
" White, 650 F. Supp. at 909. The key language in Freeman is as follows:
Long tradition and just about a universal one in American practice is for the fixation
of lawyers' fees to be determined on the following factors: time and labor required,
the difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill required to handle the problems
presented; the lawyer's experience, ability and reputation; the amount involved and
benefit resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee charged by the
Bar for similar services; the contingency or certainty of compensation; the results
obtained; and the responsibility involved . . . . Significant in the inclusion is the
factor of the amount involved. It is in the light of these principles plus the exercise
of an independent judgment by the Surrogate, an exercise of discretion affirmed by
the Appellate Division, that an affirmance is indicated.
Freeman, 34 N.Y.2d at 9, 311 N.E.2d at 484, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
The Potts court stated similar considerations; time spent, difficulties involved, amount
involved, professional standing of counsel and results obtained. In re Estate of Potts, 213
App. Div. 59, 62, 209 N.Y.S. 655, 657 (4th Dep't), af'd, 241 N.Y. 593, 150 N.E. 568
(1925). Cf. White, 650 F. Supp. at 906 (factors to be considered in determining deductibility
as listed by IRS).
It is interesting to note that the Surrogate's decree challenged in Freeman was from
Monroe County, the same county from which the Surrogate's decree involved in White was
issued. Freeman, 34 N.Y.2d at 5, 311 N.E.2d at 482, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 337. Potts was also a
Fourth Department decision. Potts, 213 App. Div. 59, 209 N.Y.S. 655.
4 White, 650 F. Supp. at 906.
18 Id. This deficiency was based mainly on the disal!owance of the entire amount of
$16,530 listed for attorney's fees. Id.
," Id. White filed a notice of claim for a refund for the amount based on the disallowance of the attorney's fees. Id. He did not contest the $646.00 reduction in the executor's
commission. Id.
,7 Id. White claimed that the proceeding was moot since he had paid the deficiency.
However, the court refused the request since the issue as to whether White's records were
subject to an IRS summons was unresolved; such records being needed in order to make an
independent determination on the allowability of the deductions already approved by the
Surrogate. Id. at 906-07.
2
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denied." In writing the decision, Judge Telesca considered the
position of the IRS as claiming the right to make a decision independent from the Surrogate's ruling under any circumstances39
The court held that this was an improper interpretation of the law
of the Second Circuit as established in Estate of Smith v. Commissioner,30 and would also be "destructive... of the proper relationship between State and Federal law .

...

"s'

The Smith court had allowed a de novo review of a Surrogate's
ruling as it was found that the Surrogate had allowed administrative expenses that were incurred for the benefit of the beneficiaries and not for the estate." This was held to be an improper
application of state law by the Surrogate and not a refusal by the
federal courts to follow state law.38
The White court found that the factors to be used in determining the deductibility of the attorney's fees as set forth by the IRS"
were all factors to be considered in determining the allowability of
" Id. at

907. The court stated:
To enforce a summons, the IRS must show that the investigation will be conducted
pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose,
that the information sought is not already within the Commissioner's possession, and
that the administrative steps required by the Code have been followed.
Id. This test to determine whether an IRS summons should be enforced was first set forth
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964). See also
United States v. MacKenzie, 777 F.2d 811, 819 (2d Cir. 1985) (reiterating the Powell criteria), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2889 (1986).
1 White, 650 F. Supp. at 909. The Appellate Division in Freeman stated that the Surrogate's Court has "broad power in the determination of the fair value of attorneys' services
rendered in estates" and they would not disturb the exercise of this discretion without
reason. In re Estate of Freeman, 40 App. Div. 2d 397, 398, 341 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513 (4th
Dep't 1973), affd, 34 N.Y.2d 1, 311 N.E.2d 480, 355 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1974).
The IRS maintains that this issue was not ripe for decision as the Surrogate's findings
were not as yet being challenged, and might never be challenged. Appellant's Opening
Brief at 21-22, United States v. White,
- F.2d - (2d Cir.) (No. 87-6046). Under the
Powell standard, the author agrees that the summonses should be issued as the IRS needs
White's records if it is to prove that the Surrogate's decision was motivated by improper
factors. See Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58. To investigate the possibility of fraud or overreaching is a legitimate purpose; White's records are unquestionably relevant to that purpose;
the Commissioner does not already have the information sought; and the proper administrative steps have been followed. See id.
0o510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975). See infra notes 57-68 and
accompanying text for discussion of this case.
" White, 650 F. Supp. at 909 (quoting Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456,
480 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (1967)).
" Smith, 510 F.2d at 482-83. See White, 650 F. Supp. at 908.
33 Smith, 510 F.2d at 483. See White, 650 F. Supp. at 908.
White, 650 F. Supp. at 906. See supra note 20 and accompanying text for list of factors.

Deductibility of Administration Expenses
attorneys' fees under New York law as enunciated in Freeman and
Potts.8 Since the state and federal standards were identical, the
court deemed it unnecessary to have to rule on the validity of the
necessity requirement of Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-3.1 The
court also found that the applicable state statute limited attorneys'
fees to those that are reasonable and, therefore, the federal inter37

ests were satisfied.

The IRS argued that the Second Circuit, in a footnote to
Smith, 8 adopted the position that, when determining the deductibility of an administration expense, the amount allowable is a fed" White, 650 F. Supp. at 908-09. See supra note 21 for factors listed by New York Court
of Appeals.
" White, 650 F. Supp. at 909, 911 n.10. The Fifth Circuit had held Treas. Reg. §
20.2053-3(a) to be valid and interpreted it as being an outside limitation even on expenses
allowable under state law. Pitner v. United States, 388 F.2d 651, 659 (5th Cir. 1967). The
Pitner court stated that the deduction for an administrative expense would have to be
within the statutory meaning of an administration expense and must be reasonable under
the circumstances. Id. These are both issues of federal law as the interests of the federal
government must be protected. Id. But see United States v. White, 650 F. Supp. 904, 91011 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (interests of government balanced against the state's interests).
While the state's interests are usually similar to the government's, these federal limitations will protect the government's interests when the state fails to protect its traditional
interests or feels it has no interest to protect. Pitner, 388 F.2d at 659.
The issue as to whether a lower state court's ruling would be binding on the IRS was not
before the Pitner court as the estate had never actually been probated and there had been
no formal administration of the estate. Id. at 652. The court implied that such a lower state
court ruling would not be binding, stating that if "state law on its face or in its application"
does not respond to interests traditionally protected by the state, federal law will work to
limit the deduction in order to protect federal interests. Id. See Marcus v. DeWitt, 704 F.2d
1227, 1229 (1 1th Cir. 1983) ("the law is established for this circuit that the state probate
court determination is not conclusive"); Hibernia Bank v. United States, 581 F.2d 741,
743-44 (9th Cir. 1978) (For administration expenses to be deductible they have to be reasonable and necessary as determined by federal law.) The Ninth Circuit specifically declined to determine "whether the Commissioner and federal courts [were] required to accept a state court's determination that the claimed administration expenses [were]
'reasonable under the circumstances.' " Hibernia, 581 F.2d at 745 n.6 (quoting Pitner, 388
F.2d at 659).
87 White, 650 F. Supp. at 908-09. The statute under which the Surrogate allowed the
attorney's fees only provided that they be "just and reasonable"; no mention is made as to
the fees being necessary. N.Y. Suaa. CT. Pnoc. AcT § 2307 (McKinney Supp. 1988). But see J.
MERTENS, supra note 10, § 26.35, at 124:
The fact that the probate court has or has not awarded the [attorney's] fee is relevant but not ordinarily conclusive as to its reasonableness, since the test of allowance
under the law of the jurisdiction may take in other evidences of such law and the
question of reasonableness is to be decided ultimately under the federal law. Nevertheless, the decrees of probate courts are frequently accepted as the basis for
allowance.
Id.
" Smith, 510 F.2d at 482 n.4.
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eral law question. 9 The White court disagreed,4 noting that the
text of that case indicated that the Smith court's decision to allow
the tax court to make a de novo review of a Surrogate's ruling was
appropriate because the interests of the federal government had
not been protected by the interests of the state in that case.' 1 In
the White case, the state and federal interests were identical."2
The White court balanced the interests of the state's right to determine proper compensation for attorneys and executors in probating an estate against the IRS's interest in enforcing the federal
tax laws. 43 Judge Telesca noted that "[s]tate courts 'have an especially strong interest and a well-developed competence' to adjudicate . . . matters" involving the determination of appropriate at"' White, 650 F. Supp. at 908. See Smith, 510 F.2d at 482 n.4. The Smith court stated that
when a question arises as to whether administration expenses not contested in the surrogate's court were "incurred for the benefit of the estate in accordance with the general
purpose of [I.R.C.] § 2053" or "for the benefit of individual beneficiaries", then "the federal courts cannot be precluded from reexamining a lower state court's allowance of administration expenses." Id. at 482. The footnote to this section states that "[s]uch administrative expenses must be of the 'type intended to be deductible', . . . ultimately a question
of federal law." Id. at 482 n.4 (quoting United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118 (1964)). See
Pitner v. United States, 388 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1967) (upholding the necessity requirement
of Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a)). See also supra note 36 for discussion of Pitner.
4' White, 650 F. Supp. at 908 ("The Government has placed undue emphasis upon this
footnote.").
41 Id.
41 Id. at 908-09. The Surrogate, under SURR. CT. Ptoc. AcT § 2307, "must allow.., such
compensation for [attorney's fees] as appear to the court to be just and reasonable" when
the executor also acts as attorney for the estate. N.Y. SURR. CT. Pioc. Acr § 2307 (McKinney Supp. 1988). Since the Surrogate had White's figures before him and he applied the
same criteria that the IRS was now attempting to apply, Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(2)
required the acceptance of the Surrogate's decision. White, 650 F. Supp. at 908-09. See supra
note 11 for pertinent text of regulation.
"' White, 650 F. Supp. at 910. The court determined that the proper balance was struck
by Justice Harlan when he wrote:
The interests of the federal treasury are essentially narrow here; they are entirely
satisfied if a considered judgment is obtained from either a state or a federal court,
after consideration of the pertinent materials, [and] of the requirements of state law
....
[T]he federal interest requires only that the Commissioner be permitted to
obtain from the federal courts a considered adjudication of the relevant state law
issues in cases in which, for whatever reason, the state courts have not already provided such an adjudication. In turn, it may properly be assumed that the state court
has had an opportunity to make, and has made, such an adjudication if, in a proceeding untainted by fraud, it has had the benefit of reasoned argument from parties
holding genuinely inconsistent interests.
Id. (quoting Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 480-81 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)). It is noted that the Surrogate's decision in White was not the result of a contested proceeding but was given after all interested parties had signed releases. Id. at 905.
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torneys' fees."' The court also reviewed Treasury Regulation
§ 20.2053-1(b)(2), upon which the IRS had based its position."
The regulation provided that a "probate court decision will ordinarily be accepted, even ifrendered by consent, if the court passes
upon the facts upon which deductibility depends."(emphasis
added)."" Since the Surrogate's Court had applied state law in or7
der to determine the allowability of the administration expenses,'
and the IRS would have applied the same standards,' 8 the federal
interest had been served in this case and there was no federal law
to apply.'
Since only state law was involved, the scope of review was limited to applicable state law.60 New York State law did not permit
further analysis of a Surrogate's discretionary fixing of attorneys'
fees unless cause is first shown. 1 Therefore, as a matter of comity,
the IRS must accept as final the Surrogate's ruling unless there is
a prima facie showing that the decision was motivated by improper
factors. 2 Without this, the IRS had no legitimate reason for requesting the records, 8 and was therefore bound by the Surrogate's ruling."
Id. at 909.
I1
48 Id. at 907, 909, 911 n.7. See supra note 11 for text of regulation.
" White, 650 F. Supp. at 911 n.7. See supra note 11 for pertinent text of regulation. See
also supra note 20 and accompanying text for factors listed by IRS to be used in determining deductibility. But see Reply of the United States to Response of James M. White to its
Petition to Enforce Internal Revenue Summonses at 8, United States v. White, 650 F.
Supp. 904 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (No. 86-140T) (decree "ordinarily" accepted provided it was
contested).
'" White, 650 F. Supp. at 909.
" Id. at 906.
" Id. at 911 n.7.
" Id. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal court sits as a state court
when ruling on state law issues).
1 White, 650 F. Supp. at 911 n.7. The court states that a Surrogate's discretionary fixing
of attorneys' fees is not subject to further analysis by a reviewing court. Id. See In re Estate
of Aaron, 30 N.Y.2d 718, 720, 283 N.E.2d 764, 766, 332 N.Y.S.2d 891, 893 (1972) ("fixation of fees . . . [is] discretionary without further analysis.").
81 White, 650 F. Supp. at 911. These factors could be "fraud, overreaching, or excessiveness by the attorney or the Surrogate." Id.
While the court speaks about whether the expense is allowable under state law, the Code
actually permits the deduction of expenses allowable under the laws of the jurisdiction. See
I.R.C. § 2053(a) supra note 6. In this case, New York has set standards to be followed, so
the law of the jurisdiction in this case is the law of the state as well. White, 650 F. Supp. at
911 n.7. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text for appropriate state law.
" White, 650 F. Supp. at 907.
Id. at 911. But see Appellant's Opening Brief at 22, United States v. White, F.2d

Journal of Legal Commentary

Vol. 3: 177, 1988

It is submitted that the Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-3(a) requirements that an administration expense be "actually and necessarily" incurred in order to be deductible is invalid as it is contrary to the plain meaning of I.R.C. § 2053(a)(2), which states that
administration expenses allowable under the laws of the jurisdiction shall be deductible." It is also submitted that a federal standard which requires an administration expense to be reasonable
violates the plain meaning of I.R.C. § 2053(a)(2) and is, therefore,
an invalid test.
It is suggested that Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-1(b)(2) allows the IRS to challenge the deductibility of an administration
expense allowed by a lower state court only if it can show evidence
of fraud, overreaching or some other factor that would show that
the decision was an invalid allowance under the law of the jurisdiction." It is further suggested that the IRS cannot challenge the
decision on the basis that it contravenes federal law or because the
IRS does not agree with the court's discretionary decision.

I.

THE

Smith LEGACY

Estate of Smith v. Commissioner57 is the leading Second Circuit

case on the ability of the IRS to challenge a deduction for admin_ (2d Cir.) (No. 87-6046) (IRS must be allowed to enforce its summonses to obtain
records in order to determine if fraud, overreaching, or excessiveness has occurred). This
rationale of the White court can lead to a classic Catch-22 situation: The IRS can only get
enforcement of the summonses if they have evidence that the figures were fraudulent or
improperly applied, yet they cannot get the evidence, if it exists, unless they are first
granted enforcement of the summonses. See id.
" See supra notes 6 & 8 for pertinent sections. While a Treasury Regulation should be
given due deference by the courts and an effort should be made to construe it as being
consistent with the I.R.C., it should be declared invalid when it goes against the plain language of Congress. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967). "The role of the
judiciary in cases of this sort begins and ends with assuring that the Commissioner's regulations fall within his authority to implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable
manner." Id.
" Cf White, 650 F. Supp. at 912. However, it is also submitted that there would be no
inconsistency in upholding Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-1(b)(2) as valid and maintaining the position that state law alone shall determine deductibility since the regulation only addresses
the issue of a lower court applying local law. See supra note 11 for text of regulation.
There is no issue of Congress intruding on state domain as the power to levy taxes is
expressly given to Congress. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. The question is
whether the IRS has overstepped its authority by intruding on an area left to the states by
Congress. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
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istration expenses after the Surrogate's Court has ruled on its allowability 8 The IRS challenged the allowability of commissions
incurred in selling estate assets as not being deductible administration expenses within the meaning of Treasury Regulation §
20.2053-3(d).5
The Tax Court held that the regulation was valid, e0 and as a
result, the Surrogate's ruling was only a threshold determination
that must still pass the test of the IRS's regulations before the administration expenses could be deductible." The Second Circuit
" Id. See White, 650 F. Supp. at 909 n.5 (Smith represents law of Second Circuit).
" Smith, 510 F.2d at 480-81. Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(d) in pertinent part states:
MISCELLANEOUS ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES.

(1) . .. Expenses necessarily incurred in preserving and distributing the estate are
deductible ....[E]xpenses [will not] be allowed for a longer period than the executor is reasonably required to retain the property.
(2) Expenses for selling property of the estate are deductible if the sale is necessary
in order to pay the decedent's debts, expenses of administration, or taxes, to preserve the estate, or to effect distribution.
Id. It is noted that Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) also applies to the other subsections of §
20.2053-3. See supra note 8 for pertinent text of Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a).
" Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650 (1972), ajf'd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975). But see id., 57 T.C. at 663 (Goffe, J., dissenting). Four
judges joined Judge Goffe's dissent which would have held Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(dX2)
invalid as being "clearly outside the scope of the Code and contrary to the intent of Congress .
I..."
Id. (Goffe, J., dissenting). Judge Goffe discounted the majority's view that the
regulation's longevity should give it greater weight. Id. at 664 (Goffe, J.,dissenting) (relying on Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (reenactment of a statute by Congress without change "is an unreliable indicium at best" to show congressional
approval of a prior decision)). The judge looked at the committee reports and found that
the limitation of State law was the only aspect Congress considered in reenacting § 2053.
Id. See Smith, 510 F.2d at 485 (Mulligan, J., dissenting) (would have reversed on opinion of
dissent in Tax Court). See also infra note 90 for Senate and House reports.
" Smith, 57 T.C. at 660-61. The proposed test is a twofold one: the deduction must "be
for an 'administration expense' within the meaning of that term as it is used in the statute,
and that the amount sought to be deducted be reasonable under the circumstances. These
• . . establish the outside limits for what may be considered allowable deductions under
Section 2053(a)(2)." Pitner v. United States, 388 F.2d 651, 659 n.I I (5th Cir. 1967). See
Spragens, supra note 9, at 434, 436 (quoting the above passage from Pitner and agreeing
with the tax court in Smith that there must be compliance with the test of the regulations).
The tax court stated that a "Solomon-like pronouncement" would be needed to value
the estate at the time of Smith's death in order to determine what expenses were necessary
to raise enough cash to pay the ensuing tax liability. Smith, 57 T.C. at 655. The court then
arrived at a figure halfway between the government's estimate and the estate's estimate. See
Echter, Equitable Treatment for the Artist's Estate, 114 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 394, 396 (the
executors had amended their valuation of the sculptures to $ 0.00). In its Solomon-like
capacity, the court then stated that that was the figure the executors should have initially
determined. See Smith, 57 T.C. at 662. But see Smith, 510 F.2d at 485 (Mulligan, J., dissenting) (determination of tax court was done with the "infallible acuity of hindsight"). Only
those commissions incurred in selling assets necessary to raise enough cash to cover ex-
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affirmed, e' but found it unnecessary to determine whether the
regulation was valid.63 Instead, the court focused on whether state
penses based on the newly set valuation of the estate were allowed as deductions. Smith, 57
T.C. at 662. See Smith, 510 F.2d at 481. One commentator has speculated that if the executors had not revised their figure downwards, whether the "Solomon-like" tax court would
have arrived at a pro-rated higher valuation. Echter, supra note 61, at 396 n.6.
This reasoning puts the executor of an estate in a very difficult position. Spragens, sup ra
note 9, at 435. The amount of cash "necessary" for federal estate tax purposes may be
unknown at the time the decision to sell some of the assets is made. Id. Smith's estate is a
prime example as his sculptures were valued at $714,000 by the estate, $5,256,918 by the
IRS, and finally at $2,700,000 by the Tax Court. Id. Sculptures are not an item easily
liquidated and the executors approached the problem of covering possible liabilities as best
they could under the supervision of the Surrogate's Court. Id. The luxury of turning down
an opportunity to sell until the final valuation is made is not always available. Id. Nor is it
always in the best interests of the estate. Id. The art world is not known for the stability of
its marketplace. Smith, 510 F.2d at 484-85.
For an appellate court to use the considered judgment of its hindsight after an estate is
settled to say that those expenses incurred in raising the exact amount that turned out to
be necessary to settle the estate and that all other expenses were then obviously incurred
for the benefit of the beneficiaries is hardly a "Solomon-like pronouncement" and puts a
tremendous burden on the executor and the Surrogate that even Solomon might not be
able to handle. See Echter, supra note 61, at 396-97. Compare Smith, 57 T.C. at 655-62
(after listing numerous factors to consider in valuing decedent's sculptures, the court enunciated $2,700,000 as the figure that should have been used even though this figure's main
relation to the case appeared to be that it was a split between the executor's figure and the
IRS's figure) with Smith, 510 F.2d at 485 (Surrogate is more appropriate than federal tax
authorities to gauge what is proper behavior for executor) and Spragens, supra note 9, at
435 (this rule might work hardships on estates like Smith's).
" Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827
(1975). The Commissioner's opposition to certiorari and the subsequent denial of the petition by the Supreme Court in the Smith case will doubtlessly encourage further controversy
on this issue and "may be only postponing the inevitable day of reckoning." Spragens,
supra note 9, at 436. Attempts to decrease the controversy surrounding estate administration have increased. Stein & Fierstein, supra note 20, at 1108. "In the last 15 years, virtually every state has, to some extent, revised its probate code to simplify and modernize
probate procedures and estate administrations." Id.
Judge Mulligan dissented from the majority in Smith, stating that Congress explicitly and
unambiguously left the determination of allowability of the deduction to state law, and
neither the tax court nor the Commissioner had any authority to change that decision.
Smith, 510 F.2d at 483 (Mulligan, J., dissenting). The judge also rejected the possibility of
the tax court making a de novo review of the case as "[tlhe laws of the state are interpreted
and administered by the courts of the state and not by the Tax Court of the United
States." Id. at 484 (Mulligan, J., dissenting). The executor makes, and the Surrogate approves, decisions and expenses as they arise and certainty is not always possible. See id. at
485 (Mulligan, J., dissenting). See also Stein & Fierstein, supra note 20, at 1108 (from the
very nature of the administrative proceeding certainty is not always possible). The determination by the tax court here was done with the 20-20 vision of hindsight and not as a result
of an obvious error by the Surrogate at the time of the decision. Smith, 510 F.2d at 485
(Mulligan, J., dissenting).
63 Smith, 510 F.2d at 483. The Sixth Circuit, however, was unconvinced of the IRS's
power to use Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(a) to challenge an expense properly allowed by state
law. Estate of Park v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1973). Park expressly

Deductibility of Administration Expenses
law had been properly followed. 4 The court stated that the law of
New York, like Treasury Regulation § 20.2053-3, required an administrative expense to be necessary to the estate. 5 Therefore, an
allowance of such an expense by the Surrogate's Court normally
would be controlling on the question of deductibility."6 In this
case, however, the administration expenses had not been previously contested, and a question existed as to whether they were
incurred "for the benefit of the estate in accordance with the general purpose of [I.R.C.] § 2053" or for the benefit of the benefirefused to follow the tax court's rationale in Smith. Id. Park held that administration expenses allowable under Michigan state law and approved by the Probate Court were deductible under the federal tax code. Id. The court stated that state law alone was controlling
under a plain reading of I.R.C. § 2053(A). Id. This was an affirmance of previous circuit
rulings. See Union Commerce Bank v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1964) (allowable deductions are determined by state law); Goodwin's Estate v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d
576 (6th Cir. 1953) (state law is controlling on the issue of deductibility).
The administrator of Park's estate argued that regulations §§ 20.2053-3(a), -3(d)(2) were
invalid. Park, 475 F.2d at 673. Alternatively, he argued that if they were valid, they were
properly complied with. Id. Since the court held that the Commissioner was in error, and
that because of the court's "disposition of the case, [they did] not reach the petitioner's
argument that the regulations were complied with," the court impliedly invalidated the
regulations. Id. at 673, 677. This implication was furthered when the court stated:
By the literal language of § 2053(a), Congress .has left the deductibility of administrative expenses to be governed by their chargeability against the assets of the estate
under state law. As otherwise stated, Congress has committed to the considered
judgment of the states whether a particular expense is allowable as a proper or necessary charge against estate assets.
Id. at 676. See Spragens, supra note 9, at 431 (by holding that Michigan law was determinative of the issue, the Park court invalidated Treas. Reg. § 20.2053-3(dX2)).
The Seventh Circuit also held that a state probate court's determination of administration expenses generally would be binding on the question of its necessity. Estate of Jenner
v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 1100, 1106 (7th Cir. 1978). The court followed Park in determining that "state law alone" should decide the allowability of an administrative expense as
a deduction. Id. See Ballance v. United States, 347 F.2d 419, 423 (7th Cir. 1965) (state law
is looked to for determination of deductibility). The Fourth Circuit seems to also follow
this reasoning. Commercial Nat'l Bank v. United States, 196 F.2d 182, 185 (4th Cir. 1952)
(dicta) (intent of Congress seems to be for state law to determine administration expenses).
The Jenner court also noted that under Illinois law, the probate court could only approve
expenses necessary in administering the estate. Jenner, 577 F.2d at 1106. As a result, the
court expressly declined to rule on the validity of regulation 20.2053-3(a). Id. at 1105 n. 12.
" Smith, 510 F.2d at 482-83. Cf Note, Estate Taxation, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 357, 357
(1975) (Smith court indicated that treasury regulations should be applied by federal courts
in de novo inquiry).
" Smith, 510 F.2d at 482. The applicable New York law at the time of this case was N.Y.
SURR. CT. Pnoc. AcT § 222 (McKinney 1938). This statute has been replaced in substantially
the same form by N.Y. EST. PowERs & TRuSm LAW § 11-1.1. See 31 Am. Jur. 2d §§ 524,
527 (1967) (allowable administration expenses are those necessarily incurred by the estate).
" Smith, 510 F.2d at 482.
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ciaries. 7 The court concluded that federal courts could properly
reexamine an allowance of administration expenses by a lower
state court under these circumstances."
The White court noted that the Smith decision was not a refusal
to follow state law, but was a finding that state law had not been
properly followed by the Surrogate's Court." Smith was thus distinguishable from White because the Surrogate's decree in White
had applied the appropriate state law as set forth by the New
York Court of Appeals."0 Without evidence that the Surrogate's
decree was an improper application of state law,7 1 a federal court,
as a matter of comity, could not undertake a de novo review of a
lower state court's decision as long as federal interests were reflected in the decision. 2
The White court avoided the test laid down by the Supreme
Court in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch 73 by distinguishing its facts
from those in Bosch. 4 A closer look shows that the test set forth in
Bosch should have been applied to the White case, with such appli78
cation dictating the same results.
II. THE Bosch TEST
In Bosch, the Supreme Court had also struggled with the question as to what effect should be given a lower state court decree
that affects a federal estate tax return." The position of the IRS
" Id. See Commercial Nat'l Bank v. United States, 196 F.2d 182, 184-85 (4th Cir. 1952)
(where expenses are challenged as being for the benefit of the beneficiaries rather than for
the estate, federal review of a state court's allowance of these expenses may be warranted).
But see Estate of Park, 475 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1973) (court refused to distinguish
between necessary estate expense and expense soley for benefit of beneficiaries, reasoning
that anything benefiting estate also benefits beneficiaries.).
" Smith, 510 F.2d at 482-83. This interpretation does not necessarily follow from a
closer reading of Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967), upon which the
Smith court relies. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text for discussion of Bosch.
"I United States v. White, 650 F. Supp. 904, 908 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
70 Id. at 908-09.
" See supra notes 21-23 for appropriate state law. See also White, 650 F. Supp. at 908-09
(appropriate statute and factors listed by court of appeals).
"' White, 650 F. Supp. at 909-12.
73 387 U.S. 456, 463 (1967).
"' White, 650 F. Supp. at 911 n.7. See infra notes 80-86 for discussion of the White court
distinguishing Bosch.
" See infra notes 87-95 for discussion of application of Bosch test to the White facts.
7' Bosch, 387 U.S. at 462.
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was that such a decree should be binding only when a judgment
reached after an adversarial proceeding is issued.7 The Court rejected this position and stated that the proper method in construing a federal tax statute was to look first to the legislative history
of the statute in order to determine the intent of Congress.7 8 The
Court alternatively held that lower state court decrees would not
be controlling in federal court as proper interpretations of state
law if the issue had not been previously addressed by the highest
court of the state. 9
The White court distinguished Bosch from the case at bar on two
counts.8" First, the Bosch Court reviewed the Senate reports on the
Code section involved, namely I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5), 1 and determined that the intent of Congress was that only proper regard,
but not finality, was to be given by federal courts to decrees of
state trial courts issued after an adversarial proceeding when computing federal tax liability.82 Conversely, the regulation at issue in
White, § 20.2053-1(b)(2), 88 specified that a lower state court decision would ordinarily be accepted if the factors used to determine
deductibility of administration expenses had been passed upon.8
Id. at 463.
Id. See Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650, 664 (1972) (Goffe, J., dissenting) (committee reports indicate that Congress considered only the limitation of state law
in enacting section 2053(a)(2)), affd, 510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827
(1975). Cf Estate of Park v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1973) (court held
that the plain unambiguous meaning of I.R.C. § 2053(a)(2) controls); Ballance v. United
States, 347 F.2d 419, 423 (7th Cir. 1965) (language of section litigated is clear and should
be applied); Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362, 369-70 (2d Cir. 1959) (when state law is clear
on subject of deductibility, it should be followed), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834 (1960).
7" Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,636,100 (Dec. 31, 1985) ("In construing
state law for federal estate tax purposes, the state's highest court is the best authority on
state law").
S0 United States v. White, 650 F. Supp. 904, 911 n.7 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
S" Bosch, 387 U.S. at 464-65. The relevant Code section dealt with a life estate with
power of appointment in surviving spouse. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(5) (1986). See S. REP. No. 1013,
80th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 4 (1948) (state court decrees should be given proper regard
as to their interpretation of the will if given after an adversarial proceeding).
" Bosch, 387 U.S. at 464-65. See S. REP. No. 1013, supra note 81. But see Spragens, supra
note 9, at 434 ("statutory language of Section 2053(a)(2) specifically adverts to local law as
a test").
" See supra note 11 for pertinent text of regulation. See also White, 650 F. Supp. at 907.
" White, 650 F. Supp. at 911 n.7. Compare Bosch, 387 U.S. at 463 (look to congressional
intent in construing a federal taxing statute) with Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.
650, 664 (Goffe, J., dissenting) (intention of Congress in enacting I.R.C. § 2053(a) was to let
state law determine deductibility of administrative expenses). New York Surrogate Court
rulings still look to the state law and not to federal standards to determine the administra77
78
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Secondly, in White, the court of appeals had already determined
the relevant state law in Freeman and Potts,85 while in Bosch no
such ruling on the relevant state law had been made by the state's
highest court."
While the facts of White are distinguishable from those in Bosch,
both cases involved a state court decision that affected an estate's
federal tax liability, and both cases should have been decided -by
using the same test.6 The legislative history of the Code section
must be considered and the intent of Congress determined."
The plain and unambiguous language of I.R.C. § 2053(a)(2)
shows that it was the intent of Congress to let the laws of the appropriate jurisdiction be the only limitation on the deductibility of
administration expenses.8 9 The legislative history of this section
also indicates that the only limitations on the deductibility of administration expenses that Congress considered were those imposed by the laws of the jurisdiction where the estate was administered.90 Therefore, the White court's consideration of federal
tion expenses. See In re Saphir's Estate, 73 Misc. 2d 907, 343 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sur. Ct. Kings
County 1973) (power to sell property can be given by the Surrogate whether or not it is
necessary for the estate under N.Y. EsT. PowEas & TRUSTS LAW § I l-. l(b)(5)(B)); In re
Larson's Estate, 87 Misc. 2d 397, 385 N.Y.S.2d 720 (Sur. Ct. Chautauqua County 1976)
(state laws determine what is necessary and proper under § 2053(a)(2)); In re Dinger's Estate, 118 Misc. 2d 781, 461 N.Y.S.2d 713 (Sur. Ct. Richmond County 1983) (court has
power to limit attorney's fees to reasonable amount despite any contrary agreement with
the fiduciary).
s See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text for discussion of Freeman and Potts.
White, 650 F. Supp. at 911 n.7. See Bosch, 387 U.S. at 459 (state trial court made
determination as to what the state law was).
" Compare Bosch, 387 U.S. at 464 (state court decision, if binding on IRS, would determine federal tax liability under I.R.C. § 2056) with White, 650 F. Supp. at 912 (state court
decision, if binding on IRS, would determine federal tax liability under I.R.C. § 2053(a)(2)).
" See Bosch, 387 U.S. at 463. See also infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text for discussion of congressional intent.
" See supra note 6 for pertinent text of Code.
" See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1954) ("deduction is limited to those
expenses allowable by the laws of the jurisdiction under which the estate is being administered and cannot exceed the value of . . . the probate estate."). When the language was
changed from "allowed" to "allowable" in 1954, no mention was made of any IRS regulation. See id.; S. RaP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 124-25 (1954) (change in language removed arbitrary distinctions of determining gross estate for purposes of funeral and other
expenses, including administration, as not deductible if they exceed value of probate estate). See also Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 650, 664 (1972) (Goffe, J., dissenting) (no indication Congress considered the limitations imposed by the regulations), aft'd,
510 F.2d 479 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975). But see United States v. Correll,
389 U.S. 299, 305-06 (1967) (" 'Treasury regulations and interpretations long continued
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interests was unwarranted; instead, an application of the Bosch test
would have shown that state law was the only factor to consider in
determining the deductibility of an administration expense under
I.R.C. § 2053(a)(2). 1
Bosch also provided some guidance as to whether the Surrogate's ruling in White was reviewable in federal court. 2 The New
York Court of Appeals has addressed the issue of determining
proper attorneys' fees," and the Bosch Court has asserted that
"the [s]tate's highest court is the best authority on its own law.""
Therefore, it is submitted that since the administration expenses
were determined to be allowable under the state law guidelines as
set forth by the court of appeals, the Surrogate's decision in White
was binding on the IRS.
CONCLUSION

The Smith court left confusion as to the role a federal court
should take in reviewing a lower state court decision affecting an
estate's federal tax liability under I.R.C. § 2053(a)(2)." The White
without substantial change, applying to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes, are
deemed to have received congressional approval and have the effect of law.' " (quoting
Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938))).
9i See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (discussion of Congress' intent).
Bosch, 387 U.S. at 464-65. If the highest court of the state has not spoken, a lower
court's decision should be "attributed some weight," but it should not be controlling. Id. at
465. See also West v. AT&T, 311 U.S. 223 (1940). There, the Court held that the decision
of an intermediate appellate state court should not be disregarded by a federal court "unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide
otherwise." Id. at 237. See also Ferrara and Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule lOb-5
and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV.263, 295 (1980) (when a federal court touches on
a matter where no state court has ruled, it is "ostensibly predicting how the relevant state's
high court would rule on the matter").
9" See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text for appropriate factors to use in determining proper attorneys' fees. See also United States v. White, 650 F. Supp. 904, 909
(W.D.N.Y. 1987) (factors listed by court of appeals in Freeman).
Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465. See also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,636,100 (Dec. 31, 1985) ("state's
highest court is the best authority on state law"). See also Estate of Smith v. Commissioner,
510 F.2d 479, 483 (2d Cir.) (Mulligan, J., dissenting) (state court finding can not be reversed by Commissioner or Tax Court), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); Estate of Park v.
Commissioner, 475 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1973) (Congress intended deductibility to be
determined by state law); Ballance v. United States, 347 F.2d 419, 423 (7th Cir. 1965)
(same).
" See Spragens, supra note 9. The split in the circuits in applying the regulations can
also cause confusion. Id. at 436. Compare Smith, 510 F.2d at 482-83 (deductible commissions
limited to those determined as necessary by Tax Court) with Park, 475 F.2d at 676 (deduct-
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court limited this role, but used a balancing test that may be difficult to apply in future cases." By using the test enunciated in
Bosch, the courts would be fulfilling the intent of Congress.97 It is
Congress' job to pass the tax laws and it is the intent of Congress,
not the intent of the IRS, that is relevant."8 A plain reading of
I.R.C. § 2053(a)(2) and a study of its legislative history shows that
Congress' intent was to allow as deductions those administration
expenses that are allowable by the laws of the appropriate jurisdiction." Any regulation passed by the IRS that is contrary to that
intent should be declared invalid by the courts.100 If the IRS is
ibility "governed by state law alone"). See generally Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742
(1970) (tax court will follow precedent of circuit that has jurisdiction of case on appeal),

afd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).

" See White, 650 F. Supp. at 910-11. Present commentary on § 2053(a)(2), however, is
equally problematic with respect to the statute's proper application. See R. STEPHENS, G.
MAXFIELD & A. LIND, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 5.03[1], at 5-5 to -6 (5th ed.
1983). Federal law must determine "What are 'funeral expenses'? What are 'administrative
expenses'?" Id. Thereafter, state law controls as to whether a deduction is allowable but,
under Bosch, a federal court may reexamine a lower state court ruling "giving only 'proper
regard' to the local decision." Id. at 5-6. Additionally, the authors subscribe to the proposition that federal review may disallow a deduction if it is found that, notwithstanding its
allowance under local law, the expense was not necessary pursuant to Treas. Reg. §
20.2053-3. Id. at 5-9. But see Note, The Estate Tax Deduction For Administration Expenses:
Reformulating Complementary Roles For Federal And State Law Under LR.C. § 2053(aX2), 67
CORNELL L. REV. 981, 1010 (1982) (necessity requirement "eviscerates" proper state law
role under the statute).
I Bosch, 387 U.S. at 464-65. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text for discussion
of congressional intent.
" See supra note 4. See also United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 357 (1957) (neither
courts "nor the Commissioner may rewrite the statute"); Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S.
441, 447 (1936) (where Congress has made clear its intent, provisions may not be added via
treasury regulations); Note, supra note 96, at 999 (presumptive validity of Treasury regulations may be overcome upon showing that they do not properly carry out the statute's
congressional mandate); Note, Current Problems Facing the Executor Taking the 2053 Estate
Tax Deduction, 30 VAND. L. REv. 795, 802 (1977) (compliance with treasury regulations not
required when they are not in accord with the intent of Congress).
e See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text for discussion of congressional intent.
See Park, 475 F.2d at 676 (court disregarded treasury regulation, concluding that Congress'
intent was to allow deductibility if allowed by state law); Estate of Posen v. Commissioner,
75 T.C. 355, 369 (1980) (Goffe, J., dissenting) (state law alone governs allowable deductions). See also Chaffin, Estate Planning and Taxation: Current Estate and Gift Tax Developments, 10 GA. ST. B.J. 427, 441-42 (1974) (state law applies exclusively as to allowable deductions). Cf Erwin, Estate administration expenses-the Ninth Circuit enters the conflict, 11 TAX
ADVISER 27, 31 (1980) (Congress could not have intended to place upon federal courts the
burden of reviewing state law determinations of allowable administration expenses).
'" See Commissioner v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 92 (1959) (the law does not allow the imposition of a tax by regulation); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. United States, 589 F.2d 1040,
1045 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (an unambiguous statute leaves no room for Treasury interpretation).
See also Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 479, 484 (2d Cir.) (Mulligan, J., dissent-
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displeased with the statute as presently drafted, it can petition
Congress to change the Code, but it cannot take upon itself the
power to change the Code to fit its own standards.
Joseph P. Gaffney

EPILOGUE

The Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision in
United States v. White. 01 The court held that "the IRS had a legitimate purpose for issuing its summonses under Powell . . . [and]

that the IRS is entitled to enforcement of its summonses. "' 10 The
court further stated that "the district court prematurely considered and decided the issue of whether the Surrogate 'passed on
the facts upon which deductibility depends.' . . . [A]t this sum-

mons enforcement stage, the validity of the Surrogate's decree is
not at issue."'" 3
In dicta, the court enunciated its beliefs as to the binding effect
on the IRS of a Surrogate's ruling.'0 The court cited both Bosch
and subsequent Supreme Court cases as authority for the IRS "to
make an independent assessment of the validity of White's fees
under applicable state law as determined by the state's highest
court."' 05 The author believes this to be an incorrect interpretation of Bosch. Bosch stated that if the highest court of the state had
not spoken on an issue, then the federal court could "apply what
they find to be the state law after giving 'proper regard' to releing) (if regulation imposes limitations above those imposed by state law as determined by
Surrogate's Court, then it is contrary to the intent of Congress and therefore invalid), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975); Mead Corp. v. Commissioner, 116 F.2d 187, 194 (3d Cir.
1940) (where statute is reenacted by Congress and left unchanged, existing treasury regulations may not be deemed ratified if they conflict with the language of the statute); Posen, 75
T.C. at 369 (Goffe, J., dissenting) (treasury regulation § 20.2053-3(a) and (d)(2) should be
declared invalid as in conflict with congressional intent.). Cf. Farrel-Birmingham Co. v.
United States, 121 F. Supp. 636, 640 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (where statute is ambiguous, treasury
regulation may not be held invalid if not wholly inconsistent with statute).
101 See N.Y.L.J., Aug. 12, 1988, at 17, col. 3.
10I Id. at 19, col. 5. Cf. supra note 29.
108 White, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 12, 1988, at 20, col. 4.
104 Id. at 20, cols. 2-4.
106 Id. at 20, col. 3.
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In the White case, the

law of New York was clearly stated by the Court of Appeals; the
Surrogate properly applied that law to the particular facts at
10 7

issue.

The Second Circuit did not seem to differentiate between determining the proper state law and applying the law to a particular
set of facts.1 08 When state law allows some discretion to the trial
court, a federal reviewing court should not be allowed to alter
that decision simply because it would have reached a different discretionary result. However, in White, the Second Circuit appeared

to imply that discretionary decisions may be altered.
.JPG

'"
'o,

Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
See supra notes 28-54 and accompanying text.
See White, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 12, 1988, at 20, cols. 2-5.

